Saturday, July 12, 2008

Cultural heritage ethics in a divided Cyprus

This is a paper I presented on the development of the illicit antiquities trade within the Cyprus Conflict until 1974 and its role in the conflict since 1974, in a session on archaeologists and anthropologists in the face of war, at the Sixth World Archaeological Congress.

Hardy, S A. 2008: "Cultural heritage ethics in a divided Cyprus". Paper presented at the 6th World Archaeological Congress, Dublin, Republic of Ireland, 29th June-4th July. Available at:


Between 1955 and 1959 and again between 1963 and 1974, archaeological excavation and survey in Cyprus was periodically interrupted by intercommunal violence and it was massively disrupted by the war of 1974.

During these years and since, Cypriot communities' cultural heritage has been damaged and destroyed through malice and neglect. This paper will explore archaeologists' and their sites' roles in the conflict and how the conflict has influenced the development of archaeology on the island.


Intracommunal, intercommunal and international violence over the past century has damaged or destroyed and caused the neglect or exploitation of much Cypriot cultural heritage (see figs. 1-4).

Fig. 1: Phlamoudhi/Mersinlik cemetery and chapel

Fig. 2: Aloa/Atlılar mosque

Fig. 3: Ayios Epiphanios/Aybifan Turkish Cypriot village

Fig. 4: Goshi/Koşşi Turkish Cypriot village

Here, I wish to explore: first, the development of the illicit antiquities trade in Cyprus between 1963 and 1974; second, the disruption of archaeological work in northern Cyprus since 1974; and third, the capacity of archaeologists and communities to resist the looting and destruction of cultural heritage in northern Cyprus.

Cypriot conflicts, Cypriot deep states

In 1955, Greek Cypriot nationalists backed by the Greek Army and the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church established a terrorist organisation, the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)(1), to fight against British colonial rule and for union with Greece, enosis (ένωσις) (Crawshaw, 1978; Stefanidis, 1999).

Then Turkish Cypriot nationalists, soon directed by the Turkish state’s Special Warfare Department (ÖHD)(2), established their own terrorist organisation, Volkan(3), renamed the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT)(4), to fight against union with Greece and for partition of the island, taksim (Çelik, 1994; KTP, 2007; Kyle, 1983).

When Britain relinquished control of the island in 1960, the Greek Cypriot leadership in the partnership Cypriot state immediately allied itself with the underground Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA)(5) and elements of the Greek Central Intelligence Service (KYP)(6) and the Greek Corps of Cyprus (ELDYK)(7).

Its paramilitaries were run by ex-EOKA government ministers and staffed by ex-EOKA fighters and had control of the police (Drousiotis, 2005; 2006; Markides, 1977; Varnava, 2005); the state of the Republic of Cyprus was usurped by an enosist para-state, or deep state.

The Greek Cypriot para-state organised the clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to create a crisis in which the Greek Cypriots would be able, in Greek Brigadier Demetrios Ioannides' words, to 'get them out of the way once and for all' (Drousiotis, 2006; see also Varnava, 2005).

In the end, the inter-communal violence of 1963-1964 drove the Turkish Cypriot community into enclaves (fig. 5), where they were trapped both by the Special Warfare Department-backed TMT that controlled those enclaves, and by the Greek Cypriot administration and police that controlled everywhere outside, and sometimes blockaded the enclaves themselves (Patrick, 1976; Stavrinides, 1976); of the bicommunal government of the Republic of Cyprus, only a 'Greek Cypriot rump government' remained (Talmon, 2006: 580)(8).

Fig. 5: map of Turkish Cypriot enclaves, December 1963-July 1974 (Hardy, 30th June 2008, after TRNCMFAPRD, 2007)

The illicit antiquities trade in the enclaves

Prodromos Panayiotopoulos (1995: 23) stated that,
By 1965 nearly half of all Turkish Cypriots were crammed in Gaza-Strip fashion, into a minuscule 1.6 per cent of the island's land-mass (Attalides 1979: 90). Many were living in over-crowded and squalid conditions in the ghettoes of old Nicosia and were dependent on mainland Turkish aid as their only means of economic survival.
And, although many things affected it, former director of the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2001: 134) did note a historic correlation between poverty and insecurity, and looting of archaeological sites (see also Megaw, 1954: 3).

Moreover, for the past century, it has been recognised that 'trade fueled the looting' (Herscher, 2001: 146; see also Herscher, 2001: 148; Markides, 1914: 3; 1915: 3; Megaw, 1952: 3), that demand drove supply.

On top of high demand in the markets and deep poverty in the source communities, the Department of Antiquities recorded that the 'anomalous conditions' between 1963 and 1974 made it impossible for them to prevent looting and trading (Karageorghis, 1964: 4).(9)

Dependent upon Turkish relief and welfare (Panayiotopoulos, 1995; Patrick, 1976), in and around the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, TMT-controlled looting, theft, smuggling and dealing were 'widespread' (Jansen, 2005: 19), indeed, 'so intense that there was even close collaboration between Turkish [Cypriot] looters and Greek [Cypriot] mediators and collectors' (Hadjisavvas, 2001: 135).(10)

Already - and, notably, Greek Cypriot - antiquities collectors were incidentally funding Turkish Cypriot TMT's terrorism against both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities and their cultural heritage, managing to make a terrible situation even worse.

Antiquities smuggler and dealer Michel van Rijn (1993: 25) stated that Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III collected 'icons.... which must have been looted from churches'.

Indeed, the Greek Cypriot administration's Department of Antiquities 'salvage[d]' artefacts (Karageorghis, 2000: 217; see also Hofstadter, 1994: 59-64), with the financial support of the administration's ambassadors to UNESCO, first Anastasios Leventis and later his nephew Constantinos Leventis, and the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church (Karageorghis, 2000: 215; 218; see also Karageorghis, 1990: 6-7; 9; 1998: 15).

When they "salvaged" valuable artefacts, however, they did not "rescue" them from the market: Ellen Herscher (2001: 148 - original emphasis) observed that smugglers took well-known artefacts, which they knew they couldn't sell elsewhere, with the 'expect[ation] that the Cyprus government' - or a proxy - 'would buy [them] back' (see also Van der Werff, 1989: 11).(11)

There was evidence that the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities was salvaging artefacts by making deals with people like Turkish drugs-and-antiquities smuggler Aydın Dikmen (Hofstadter, 1994: 62).

Not only did Dikmen loot churches himself and deal antiquities for the Turkish army commanders who looted (van Rijn, 1993: 27-29; 187), but he also smuggled heroin (Christou, 2006), a trade controlled by elements of the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MİT)(12) (Nezan, 1998), for which his Turkish Cypriot agent, former TMT fighter "Tremeşeli" Mehmet Ali İlkman, had worked (Özgen Açar, 27th May 1989, cited in Jansen, 2005: 23; see also Aşkın, 2006; Kıbrıs, 6th January 2006, cited in ROCPIO, 2006; Yeni Düzen, 1st February 2008, cited in ROCPIO, 2008).

This outstanding example very quickly demonstrates the existence of a dual heroin-and-antiquities trade in Cyprus, controlled by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot deep state(s); as it is known that the Turkish deep state funds its activities through smuggling, as it did the destruction of an Armenian monument through heroin smuggling (Nezan, 1998).

This hints at something I will return to later, which is how Greek Cypriot archaeologists' choice to "salvage" cultural heritage ultimately led them to fund its destruction, and even the repression of those who would fight against its destruction.

1974, coup and invasion

After the CIA-backed Greek Army held a coup and established the Regime of the Colonels in Greece in 1967, President Archbishop Makarios accepted the idea of Cypriot independence.

Then EOKA was reincarnated as EOKA-B and the spurned Greek Junta and the Greek Cypriot para-state worked to overthrow the Greek Cypriot leadership and unite Greece and Cyprus (Drousiotis, 2006; Markides, 1977; Stavrinides, 1976).

In 1974, the CIA-backed Greek Junta held a coup against President Archbishop Makarios with the help of EOKA-B (Hitchens, 2001), whereupon the simultaneously CIA-backed Turkish Special Warfare Department directed the invasion of the island and the occupation of northern Cyprus with the help of TMT (Çelik, 1994).

The Greek Cypriot coup regime and the Greek Junta both collapsed, but, lacking guarantees of Turkish Cypriot security, the Turkish Army remained (Birand, 1985) (see fig. 6).

Fig. 6: administrative map of Cyprus since 1974 (Hardy, 30th June 2008, after CIA, 2008)

When it did, the Turkish Cypriot deep state survived and was institutionalised: TMT leader Rauf Denktaş became president of the Turkish Cypriot administration(13); TMT itself was reformed as the Turkish Armed Forces' (TSK)(14) local auxiliaries, the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces Command (GKK)(15); and they had their own auxiliaries in the Civil Defence Organisation (SST)(16) (Akıncı and Düzel, 2007; Irkad, 2000; Kanlı, 2007; Mehmet Levent, 11th May 2001, cited in ROCPIO, 2001).

Although archaeological sites and Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage have been damaged and destroyed throughout the island, it is upon damage to and destruction of archaeological sites and Greek Cypriot cultural heritage in northern Cyprus I now wish to concentrate.

Occupation, secession, non-recognition and intervention

After looting and destruction of antiquities in northern Cyprus were reported, Turkish archaeologists were sent to advise the Turkish Cypriot administration, but UNESCO's Councilor for Cultural Heritage Jacques Dalibard (1975, cited in Jansen, 2005: 24) found that it lacked the money and expertise to solve the many problems, which included disturbance, damage, destruction, theft, loss and neglect (see also Şevketoğlu, 2000a: 116; 2000b: 53); however, his uncompromising report was 'suppressed' (Jansen, 2005: 27).(17)

One archaeologist (2008: Pers. Comm.) told me that, at the same time, the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities
made clear to all archaeologists [informally]... that if anyone of their nationality worked in the North, all projects of that nationality [in the South] would be closed, and this didn't seem at all surprising or unreasonable in the circumstances.
A different archaeologist (2008: Pers. Comm.) explained how 'attitudes [in the south] hardened', 'as [the] Department could not control things on the ground in the north anymore', so 'it could not issue a... Licence to Excavate' and it was 'inconceivable' for archaeologists to conduct 'what seemed like illegal excavations'.

To another archaeologist (2007: Pers. Comm.), '[i]t seem[ed] that this aspect of links to the north ha[d] been especially singled out by the south for restrictions'.

When that happened, however, at a time of 40% unemployment and 'below subsistence wages' for those who were employed in the North (Pollis, 1979: 97), at a time of such poverty that Adamantia Pollis (1979: 98) perceived 'massive violations of economic rights in terms of food, clothing, fuel, employment, and housing', where the only economy was the black market and the export trade, inactive archaeological sites were looted across the North (Mehmet Yaşin, 26th April-17th May 1982, cited in ROCPIO, 1997: 37; 62; 70; 71).

The Greek Cypriot administration then presented the 'deserted and abandoned' sites, 'falling victim to plundering, destruction or obliteration' (ROCPIO, 1997: 35).

The situation was so farcically calamitous that the Turkish Cypriot antiquities director (Anonymous, 1982, cited in ROCPIO, 1997: 35) revealed that: 'For the protection of the archaeological site of Salamis a fence has been placed. Recently, however, we have ascertained that unknown persons have... stolen the fence'.

Icon smugglers were caught and the icons were held by Kyrenia District Court as evidence, only for them to be stolen from the court itself (ROCPIO, 1997: 33).

UNESCO versus the Security Council

UNESCO's 1954 (Art. 5, Para. 1) Hague Convention required the occupying power, Turkey, to 'support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property', but the Greek Cypriot administration refused to work or to permit others' work in the occupied areas, so there was nothing for Turkey to support, and it wasn't required to do anything else(18) (Boylan, 1993: 53; Gerstenblith, 2006: 343).

Neither UNESCO's 1954 Convention nor its 1956 Recommendation considered rescue archaeology and the 1956 Recommendation demanded that the occupying power 'take all possible measures to protect these [chance] finds', but 'refrain from carrying out archaeological excavations' (UNESCO, 1956: Art. 6, Para. 32).

UNESCO's 1999a (Art. 9, Para. 1b) Second Protocol commanded the occupying power to 'prohibit and prevent... any archaeological excavation, save where this is strictly required to safeguard, record or preserve cultural propert' (19), but it only enabled rescue archaeology; it didn't require it, as Patty Gerstenblith (2006: 346) believes it needs to - and the Greek Cypriot administration had made its opposition to any excavations clear twenty-five years before.

Yet, in 1983, the Turkish Cypriot administration had made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)(20).

As Turkish Cypriot Alkan Çağlar (Chaglar, 2007) observed, 'it was never founded by the popular will of the Turkish Cypriot community.... there was no prior campaign, no prior popular demonstrations on the streets for independence, nor a plebiscite', but it was declared nevertheless, turning the "simple" occupied territory into a secessionist state.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC, 1983: 15; 16) Resolution 541 judged the declaration 'invalid' and therefore required 'all States not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus'.

UNESCO's Dalibard had deemed a permanent UNESCO presence in northern Cyprus essential (Jansen, 2005: 27), but, as the Council of Europe's rapporteur Ymenus van der Werff (1989: 5) observed, since the invalid declaration, 'the only way Unesco could in fact intervene is on the condition that it recognize the government in the north, which no United Nations organization is able to do' (see also Boylan, 1993: 127; Constantinou and Papadakis, 2001; UNSC, 1983: 15-16)(21).

Since then, northern Cyprus has been a 'no-man's land' (Navaro-Yashin, 2003: 107), the former inhabitants of which have no effective national authorities and the current inhabitants of which have no competent national authorities.

The Republic of Cyprus consists only of the Greek Cypriot rump parliament in southern Cyprus; the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is, according to its own former Vice President Mustafa Akıncı, 'in theory independent but, concretely,... run from Turkey through the civil and military bureaucracy'(22) (Akıncı and Düzel, 2007).(23)

Now, doing the cultural heritage work required by international law according to the Hague Convention (UNESCO, 1954), is itself illegal under international law according to the Security Council Resolution (UNSC, 1983), because it necessitates a licence from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which would constitute recognition of the TRNC as a national authority competent to grant or deny work permits.

Turkish Cypriot archaeologists are 'not permitted to interfere with [abandoned, exposed] site[s] in any way - not even to back fill the open excavations' (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 53).

[Some] 'rescue operation[s]' have been conducted (Şevketoğlu, 2002: 100), but they were branded 'illegal'(24) by the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities (CYNA, 2003; Hadjicostis, 2004; ROCPIO, 2005b).

And, as Müge Şevketoğlu (2000b: 56) notes, 'if anything beyond the financial or specialist abilities of Turkish Cypriot archaeologists goes wrong [they] are accused of neglecting or destroying [their] own cultural heritage'.

Freedom to act

Turkish Cypriot archaeologists and other academics and media have exposed, documented and protested against the damage and destruction of cultural heritage by business and the military (Afrika, 6th November 2005, cited by ROCPIO, 2005c; Bahceli, 2004; Cyprus Today, 2nd-8th April 2005, cited by ROCPIO, 2005a; Yüksel, 2007a: 7; 2007b: 41; 46).

Yet it is estimated that, since 1974, hundreds of religious buildings have been damaged (ROCPIO, 2007b: 3), and tens of frescoes and mosaics, thousands of artefacts and tens of thousands of icons have been stolen from or destroyed in northern Cyprus (Georgiou-Hadjitofi, 2000: 225).

Here, I can only give a brief explanation of how and why cultural property is being attacked, but cultural heritage workers cannot protect it.

Kutlu Adalı and Abdullah Çatlı

Although it was unproved, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR, 2005: 4-5) recorded Turkish Cypriot journalist Kutlu Adalı's wife İlkay's allegation that he was murdered by members of the Civil Defence Organisation, because he had accused them of emptying a tomb in the Monastery of St. Barnabas (of '[buried] treasure of war', 'the jewellery gathered from the residences of the fleeing Greek Cypriots' (Açan, 2000)). (25)

In fact, one of the few certainties in the case is that the same Uzi killed Kutlu Adalı and Ömer Lütfü Topal (Irkad, 2000), who owned the Jasmine Court Hotel and Casino in Kyrenia that Grey Wolf Abdullah Çatlı stayed in when Kutlu Adalı was murdered on the 6th of July 1996 (CAN, 2003), and who was killed by Çatlı three weeks later, on the 28th of July, possibly for laundering money for the Chechen mafia, the Russian mafia and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)(26) (Çekirge, 1996).

The Grey Wolves are a Turkish nationalist extremist group and their leader Abdullah Çatlı performed 'services for the Turkish [deep] state', including 'attacks on Armenian interests' and on rival Armenian terrorists(27), and the bombing of the Armenian Genocide Memorial at Alfortville in Paris on the 3rd of May 1984 (Nezan, 1998).

The Turkish National Intelligence Organisation paid Çatlı with heroin and he and the Grey Wolves funded their activities by trafficking and dealing (Nezan, 1998).

As the assassination of Kutlu Adalı indicates, Çatlı was also active in Cyprus (Milliyet, 10th February 2000, cited in AA, 2000; Zengin, 2008; Zaman, 13th February 2001, cited in AA, 2001).

And we know from Dikmen and İlkman and others that the antiquities trade through Cyprus is part of a dual drugs-and-antiquities trade, antiquities being taken, smuggled and sold by the same organisations that traffic heroin - those constituting the Turkish deep state (Özgen Açar, 27th May 1989, cited in Jansen, 2005: 23; see also Aşkın, 2006; Christou, 2006; Kıbrıs, 6th January 2006, cited in ROCPIO, 2006; Nezan, 1998; van Rijn, 1993: 27-29; 187: Yeni Düzen, 1st February 2008, cited in ROCPIO, 2008).

The Turkish deep state funds nationalist destruction and domination by smuggling and dealing, and when buyers "salvage" artefacts from the market, they inadvertently fund the Turkish deep state.

Since 1974,
There ha[ve] been more than 31 bombings, 10 arsons, 4 gun firings [shootings] and 1 murder with political motivations.... In all these bombings and arsons no[-]one has ever been found for t[h]ese actions.... Victims and others in threatened position have always claimed a link between these and the "Deep State" (CAN, 2003; see also Uludağ, 2004).
In that atmosphere, it is unsurprising that former Famagusta police chief Tema Irkad observed that '[i]t is still on the minds of the Turkish [Cypriot] population how Mr Kutlu Adalı... was shot dead' (Irkad, 2005).

Furthermore, since 2001, the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces-directed Civil Defence Organisation - which evolved from the TMT - has itself directed 'the [Turkish] deep state's arm in the TRNC'(28), the reincarnation of the Turkish Resistance Organisation, TMT-B (Arıkanoğlu, 2006).

In this situation, Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage workers and the community know what they can do and do what they can, but, unfortunately, it is too little.

[I changed the sentence ending and paragraphing to be easy to read on a blog.]
  1. Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (ΕΟΚΑ))
  2. Özel Harp Dairesi (ÖHD); developed from the Tactical Mobilisation Group (Seferberlik Taktik Kurulu (STK)) in 1965 (Çelik, 1994)
  3. Volcano
  4. Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT)
  5. Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (Ιερός Δεσμός Ελλήνων Αξιωματικών (ΙΔΕΑ))
  6. Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion (Κεντρική Υπηρεσία Πληροφοριών (ΚΥΠ))
  7. Elliniki Dynami Kyprou (Ελληνική Δύναμη Κύπρου (ΕΛΔΥΚ))
  8. Stefan Talmon (2002: 40) observed that, '[i]n fact, there was no alternative: if the United Nations had not treated the Greek Cypriot rump government as "the government of Cyprus", there would have been no competent functioning organ of the host State to express the consent required for the creation of UNFICYP under Chapter VI of the UN Charter'.
  9. Hadjisavvas (2001: 137) has conceded that the Greek Cypriot police has been unable to crack the local looting and dealing operations in the South because 'there is a strong solidarity among the villagers, dating back to the time of the liberation struggle', that is, the EOKA fighters’ campaign for enosis.
  10. The bicommunal nature of the northern Cypriot illicit antiquities trade survived the partition of the island in 1974 (van der Werff, 1989: 7; van Rijn, 1993: 27).
  11. Since 1974, there have also been clandestine activities, the Greek Cypriot secret service employed to "rescue" artefacts and smuggle them from the areas under Turkish Cypriot administration to the areas under Greek Cypriot administration; this became public knowledge when agent Stephanos Stephanou was caught by Turkish Cypriot police, during their raid on three Turkish Cypriot antiquities smugglers (Christou, 2007a; 2007b; Kıbrıs, 20th October 2007, cited in ROCPIO, 2007). The way these activities came to light weakens the claim that if the Greek Cypriot administration didn't 'salvage' artefacts, they would be lost (Karageorghis, 2000: 217) and undermines the assertion that 'an official state, Turkey, plunders and detains the cultural treasures of another state, Cyprus' (Anagnostopoulou, 2000: 37; see also Leventis, 2000: 146). Neither the Turkish Cypriot administration, nor the Turkish state, nor even the Turkish army, per se, "plunders" northern Cyprus (see Christou, 2007a; 2007b; Cormack, 1989: 31; Kıbrıs, 20th October 2007, cited in ROCPIO, 2007; van der Werff, 1989: 9); the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalist gangs that do, however, are incredibly powerful and constitute a "deep state", similar to the Greek and Greek Cypriot nationalist deep state that operated throughout the island between 1960 and 1974.
  12. Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı (MİT)
  13. Between 1975 and 1983, the Turkish Cypriot administration was named the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti (KTFD)); since 1983, it has been named the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (KKTC)).
  14. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (TSK); the Turkish military forces in Cyprus are called the Turkish Cypriot Peace Forces (Kıbrıs Türk Barış Kuvvetleri (KTBK)).
  15. Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı (GKK)
  16. Sivil Savunma Teşkilatı (SST)
  17. It should be noted that Dalibard later explained that he had 'to go from one side to the other and try to convince [all] the armies... not to blow up the heritage buildings.... and to stop the looting and all these things' (Dalibard and Donaldson, 1999)
  18. Notwithstanding that, the Council of Europe's Rapporteur and Consultant Expert both confirmed that the Turkish government and the Turkish army made some efforts to protect Cypriot cultural heritage (Cormack, 1989: 31; van der Werff, 1989: 9). I want to make it very clear that I'm not denying that a lot of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage has been destroyed: a lot has, just as a lot of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage has also been destroyed; I'm merely trying to reserve blame for those who are responsible, primarily the Greek and Turkish deep states.
  19. UNESCO (1999b) stated that 'it should wherever possible be carried out in close co-operation with the competent national authorities of the occupied territory'; Gerstenblith (2006: 347 - emphasis added) said that 'if the national authorities are not able to do so, then the occupying power should have the responsibility for preservation, in consultation with the competent national authority if possible.'
  20. Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (KKTC)
  21. Though very, very little of the financial aid promised to the Turkish Cypriot community has actually been spent (the Economist, 2008), the European Union and the United Nations have managed to support some cultural heritage work in northern Cyprus; as far as I understand, international organisations pay private contractors, who are licensed to work, and whose work is licensed, by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), but the international organisations affirm that they do not recognise the TRNC; the fact that the workers and their works are licensed by the TRNC is ignored by the international organisations, and the fact that the international organisations do not recognise the TRNC is ignored by the TRNC itself.
  22. 'KKTC kâğıt üzerinde bağımsız. KKTC'yi asker ve sivil bürokrasisiyle Türkiye yönetiyor.'
  23. I haven't spent too much time looking for analogies as yet, but this is certainly very different from the two examples of occupation most discussed on the World Archaeological Congress list, Afghanistan and Iraq, and appears to be unique: the competent national authorities represent the community exiled from the occupied areas; the community living under occupation have no internationally recognised authorities; and the Declaration of Independence renders the European Union and the United Nations unable to work even through the legally recognised occupying power; thus, responsibility falls upon the one authority that has no authority and upon the one archaeological community that lacks money, expertise, facilities and even the ability to receive foreign help to compensate for the problems caused by its occupation, precisely because it lives under occupation.
  24. The Republic of Cyprus signed UNESCO's (1999a) Second Protocol in 1999, but continues to base its condemnation of the Turkish Cypriot rescue excavations, begun the same year, on the 1954 law and 1956 guidelines; because of United Nations Security Council (UNSC, 1983) Resolution 541, those excavations are still illegal, but the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities' awareness of the contradiction between the laws is suggested by their exclusion of the Second Protocol from their presentation of the problem.
  25. The Turkish Revenge Brigade (Türk İntikam Tugayı (TİT)) was accused of and did claim responsibility for Adalı's murder (AI, 1997; RSF, 2004; see also Özap, 2005)). The Turkish Revenge Brigade is a deep state 'death squad' (IPS, 1998; see also Keskiner and Durduran, 2002), a wing of the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar)/Idealist Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları), which are strictly speaking the youth wing, but practically the paramilitary wing, of the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)), which was first led by Alparslan Türkeş, a Turkish Cypriot who had taken part in the 1960 military coup against the Turkish government (Ganser, 2005: 228; Lee, 1997).
  26. Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK)
  27. Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
  28. 'derin devlet'in [Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti] KKTC'deki kolu' (Arıkanoğlu, 2006).

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  1. enjoyed reading your paper.

    thanks for the good work.

  2. I'm just glad it was comprehensible; every time I read through it I kept finding something I felt needed explaining better. I pity the people who heard it at the conference though; I only had seven or eight minutes, so I didn't get to say that much, let alone have a chance fully to explain what was said.

  3. It's good to be able to read your whole paper - I appreciated the seven minutes you were able to give at WAC, and always knew there was so much more behind what you were saying - so I am glad you have posted up the whole thing.

  4. I would have said that you could read the copy I sent you to pass on, but I didn't want you to think I was expecting you to.

  5. this is a real shame.